Be careful. Three engineering degrees, one of them focused on structures, analysis, and failures, 27 years experience accurately diagnosing and fixing product with failures, including time reconstructing accidents, instrument rated private pilot flying all over the USA, designed and building a composite airplane... NOT an armchair engineer.
Witnesses - Rapid wing oscillations came from eyewitnesses. While eyewitness accounts are notorious for inaccuracy, if wing oscillations are reported in several cases, you gotta investigate it seriously. This does indicate that flutter occurred at some point along the accident sequence.
Overstress - Accident investigators found overstressed parts. Whoopee. This IS the expected case in an accident. And whether the pilot over loaded parts of the airframe with a strong push, or if flutter grew to the point of overloading parts of the airplane, or flutter plus pilot inputs overloaded parts of the airframe, you are going to have evidence of overload. If nothing got way out of shape, there would not have been a crash...
Now one path that could be taken is that flutter was secondary - it occurred after the airframe was damaged by excess negative-g or excess negative g rate. In this theory, the wing system was damaged by sudden nose down inputs, with some parts weakened or detached, and then the airframe was too soft and fluttered, resulting in the final failure.
How a failure analyst can tell the difference between broken parts from flutter and broken parts from overload is beyond me. I have investigated a bunch of parts damaged by two-way loading in resonance, but in many, the damage was one-way only. If the structure shows damage in both directions, it is an indicator of possible flutter, but if it the structure has somewhat more resistence to damage in one direction than in the other, it will only show one-way damage. Lack of two-way damage does not conclusively prove that flutter did not occur.
Human Factors - I shall put to you that if a pilot can easily over-g the airframe, EITHER the structure is short on strength somewhere OR the control system has an inadequate feedback to the pilot OR both.
Fixes involve:
Raising the control gradient;
Beef up the limiting parts of the structure.
Each distance you from failure. The former gives more feedback to the pilot, the latter has the simultaneous advantages of putting failure at greater g-loadings and reducing susceptibility to flutter. A combination of the two would sure drive this failure much farther from normal operations.
Other approaches could certainly be taken, but I am still left with the feeling the this airplane is short on something significant. Blaming the pilots when almost all other airplanes of similar mission are not folding up and falling from the sky is neglecting the bigger issue.
Billski