Its a pretty poor fault analysis really.
Big picture to me looks more like, those seeking to make money from aviation dislike the Audit / standards team (that's what the FAA does basically) because that's what they do, so pressure as part of general deregulation across the board saw reduced funding / authority / ability to make changes plus multiply fiscal crisis's due to pure politics over the span of 40 plus years, got us to this point. It didn't happen over night.
It's funny how the vast majority of criticism of ODAs comes from those who know the least about them out how they work...
I fail to see how making the approvers government employees (with Uncle Sam signing the paychecks) is going to magically make them able to discern when they are deliberately being fed misleading information by the applicants.
From my experience working under one, by biggest gripe is how jammed up the ODA gets over meaningless paperwork and other non-value-added, non-technical matters (like endless tweaking of the Manual or arguing over properly filling out the Form 8100-9).
In my experience though, the vast majority of ARs (basically the DERs in an ODA) are extremely well qualified and have a much better finger on the pulse of development within the company than any outsider could hope to have.
I thought the problem was fundamentally cruddy engineering judgement, with fundamentally cruddy engineering management, enabled and demanded by fundamentally ethically flawed b-school boys. The fundamentally underqualified or disinterested oversight team missed all the red lights.
It is inconceivable that this level of organizational failure is unique.
But enough whining. The larger an organization, the more complex the project, the more that less ethically distanced people become attached to a project, the more likely it is that these things will happen. This isn't the last time this will happen.